Tasini v. New York Times: Wrong Issue, Wrong Presumption by Freeman, Kia L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1999
Tasini v. New York Times: Wrong Issue, Wrong
Presumption
Kia L. Freeman
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kia L. Freeman, Tasini v. New York Times: Wrong Issue, Wrong Presumption, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 841 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol32/iss3/15
TASINI V. NEW YORK TIMES:
WRONG ISSUE, WRONG PRESUMPTION
After all, the object of copyright is not only to protect the
author's intellectual efforts, but also the distribution of
knowledge.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A freelance author sells first publication rights of an article to a
major periodical. Later, he receives an e-mail from an interested
reader who found the article in an on-line database. The author sub-
sequently learns that the publisher of the periodical sold the rights to
his article to an on-line, computer-assisted text retrieval system
similar to LEXIS/NEXIS. The potential readership of the article has
thus expanded greatly. However, the author was never compensated
for this electronic publication. In accordance with industry stan-
dards, the author has a very informal contract with the publisher.
Does the author deserve additional compensation? In a much antici-
pated decision, a federal district court judge ruled "no."2
A photographer sells a publisher the right to include his photo-
graph in an art book. The publisher later puts all of the photographs
from the book on its website. Visitors to the website can download
any image that appeals to them. Under the same ruling, the photog-
rapher may be unable to prevent the publisher's free distribution of
his work.
1. Egbert J. Dommering, Copyright Being Washed Away Through the
Electronic Sieve. Some Thoughts on the Impending Copyright Crisis, in THE
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 1, 10 (P. Bernt Hugen-
holtz ed., 1996).
2. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826-27 (S.D.
N.Y. Aug. 13, 1997) (Tasini I), reh'g denied, 981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
29, 1997) (Tasini II).
3. See generally id.
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"An increasing number of print publications are distributing
their works on the Internet or other electronic media." 4 Communi-
cation via computer networks will soon be, if it is not already, the
least expensive and most effective means of communicating with
large audiences. 5 Some believe that the Internet has revolutionized
publishing to the same degree as the Gutenberg printing press.
6
While the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works envisioned electronic publishing as offering the
copyright owner more control over distribution than traditional pub-
lishing,7 the reverse may actually be true. The crucial question in
this regard has now become: Who owns that copyright?
The much anticipated 8 Tasini v. New York Times Co. decision is
a triumph for publishers who have been strugglin with freelance
authors for control of electronic publishing rights. Relying on a
never before interpreted provision of the Copyright Act of 1976,
Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the United States District Court for the
4. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Electronic Data Bases and Rights of
Freelancers, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 9, 1997, at 3.
5. See Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer
Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409, 413 (1992).
6. See Dean Takahashi, Paper-Less Publisher, L.A. TIMES (Orange
County ed.), Mar. 2, 1994, at D1.
7. It is now technologically possible to distribute text, data and
graphics electronically rather than in traditional printed forms....
In addition, more and more textual materials appearing ultimately
in printed form exist at some state in the production process in
digital form on tapes and disks or other electronic storage devices.
The full text of certain legal materials, such as court decisions, can
already be displayed on computer terminals from distant data
bases.
... If the copyright owner possesses material in digital form on
tapes or other storage devices and sells access to such material by
contracts with users, the copyright owner may have more effective
control over unauthorized use than over information distributed in
printed form.
U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU), FINAL REPORT, at 196 (July 31, 1978) (2
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) Aug. 31, 1978).
8. See, e.g., John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Dweck, Publisher, Authors
Battle Over Electronic Rights: Debate Over Allocation of Rights and Money
Sparks Lawsuits and Birth of the Authors' Registry, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996,
at C17.
9. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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Southern District of New York ruled that publishers are presumed to
have the right to include underlying works in any revision of a col-
lective work.10  Judge Sotomayor further interpreted 'revision'
broadly enough to encompass any work that includes the original
selection of a specific type of underlying work.1" Authors must now
explicitly exclude revision rights in contracts to avoid the statutory
transfer of these rights to the publishers.
12
"[W]hile other district courts are not bound to follow Judge
Sotomayor's ruling, the thoroughness of the opinion and the detailed
record before the court make it highly persuasive."' 3 Since the deci-
sion originates from the publishing hub of New York, 14 the publish-
ing industry may give the decision substantial weight even without
additional judicial support.
The ramifications of Tasini remain uncertain. The decision can
be narrowly interpreted to extend the established publishers' practice
of creating archival libraries of periodicals on microfilm to CD-ROM
and LEXIS technology. 15 Alternatively, the decision can be broadly
interpreted to grant publishers the right to distribute articles on the
Internet provided that some rudimentary aspect of the original publi-
cation is preserved. 16 The winning defendants are inclined to use the
latter broad interpretation as the basis for their business decisions.'
7
This threat has sparked the creation of the Publication Rights
10. See id. at 824-27.
11. See id. at 825.
12. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
13. Dale M. Cendali & Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., Freelancers Reeling in Fight
over Online Rights: Unless Congress Takes Action, Authors May Be Denied
Pay for Electronic Publishing Rights, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C2.
14. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1996 670 (Robert
Famighetti ed., 1995).
15. "The Internet and Web are[ not], in fact, expressly mentioned even once
in the 56-page opinion by U.S. District Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor. [Per-
haps the omission is due to the fact that t]he suit was filed in 1993 before the
medium took off as a communications phenomenon." Court Decision Extends
to Web: N.Y Times Exec, MEDIA DAILY, Aug. 18, 1997, at 5, available in
1997 WL 7731127.
16. See Cendali & Reyes, supra note 13.
17. "George Freeman, the [New York Times'] assistant general counsel, told
Media Daily that the newspaper believes Wednesday's court decision extends
to 'electronic revisions of the newspaper wherever they may be,' including the
Web." Court Decision Extends to Web: N.Y Times Exec, supra note 15.
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Clearinghouse, 18 an agency designed to ensure that authors receive
their fair share of revenues from the information industry.19
This Note addresses the implications of Tasini with respect to
the emerging electronic publishing industry and suggests alternative
paths by critiquing the reasoning of the court. Part II summarizes the
facts of the case and gives the current procedural history. Part III de-
scribes the court's reasoning. Part IV addresses the fundamental is-
sues raised by the case, including: (1) whether statutory transfers of
rights should be possible when an express transfer exists; (2) whether
plaintiffs must raise a breach of contract claim for a court to find that
an express transfer does not include certain rights; (3) whether inci-
dental display rights are an integral part of reproduction or distribu-
tion rights; and (4) what analysis should be used to determine if a
subsequent collective work qualifies as a revision of the original.
Part V concludes that the court overlooked the true issues presented
by this case in its eagerness to use existing case law to interpret a
never before interpreted section of the Copyright Code. The court
should have addressed these novel issues in light of the code without
regard to previous unrelated case law; if it had, revision rights would
have been more narrowly and reasonably defined.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Tasini, the plaintiffs were various freelance writers who, be-
tween 1990 and 1993, had contributed articles for publication in the
periodicals of the defendant publishers. 20 The defendants published
leading national periodicals including the New York Times, Newsday,
and Sports Illustrated.
21
The writers' agreements with their publishers varied but were all
relatively informal.22 The least formal agreements were oral agree-
ments with the New York Times.23 These agreements covered the
18. See Kennedy & Dweck, supra note 8.
19. See National Writers Union and the Uncover Company Create Copy-
right Model for Electronic Database Industry, ONLINE LIBRARIES &
MICROCOMPUTERS, Apr. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8156502 [hereinafter
National Writers Union].
20. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
21. See id. at 806.
22. See id. at 807.
23. See id.
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topic and length of the article, the deadline for submission, and the
fee; there was no discussion of which rights would be transferred to
the New York Times with respect to the agreement.24 The agreements
with Newsday were similar to those with the New York Times, except
that Newsday included some contractual language in the endorsement
on the payment checks. 25 The endorsements specifically granted
Newsday the "right to include [plaintiffs articles] in electronic li-
brary archives." 26 The most formal agreement involved in this case
was a written contract with Sports Illustrated.27 The contract ex-
pressly granted Sports Illustrated three rights: (1) "the exclusive
right first to publish the Story in the Magazine," (2) the non-
exclusive right to republish the article in other publications on the
condition that the author be paid additional compensation, and (3)
the non-exclusive right to license such republication on the condition
that the author be paid additional compensation.
2 8
The controversy arose from agreements under which the peri-
odical publisher defendants (print publishers) sold the contents of
their periodicals to the electronic publisher defendants (e-publishers)
for inclusion in assorted electronic databases (e-publication). The
print publishers and e-publishers entered into these agreements be-
ginning in 1982.29 The e-publishers included MEAD Corporation
and University Microfilms Inc. (UMI).3 ° MEAD owns and operates
NEXIS, an on-line electronic text retrieval system.31 UMI produces
CD-ROM products, such as the New York Times OnDisc, which op-
erate like NEXIS but consist exclusively of all articles published in
the New York Times.
32
The print publishers transmitted computer files containing the











the e-publishers. 33 These transmissions included formatting instruc-
tions. 4 The e-publishers focused on the text of the articles alone.
35
Their products did not include the advertisements and photographs
from the original print publications.36 The e-publishers preserved the
original formatting only to the extent that a header attached to the
text of each article identified the title of the article, the author, the
periodical, and the page on which it originally appeared.37 In this
form, the e-publishers incorporated each article from the original pe-
riodicals into their database products. 38 The articles became avail-
able via the products of the e-publishers approximately one publish-
ing cycle after the original publication.39
Customers could access the NEXIS database on-line.4 ° Users
typically accessed the New York Times OnDisc via a computer net-
work.41 Customers of the e-publishers accessed articles within the
databases by choosing from libraries of publications and inputting
specific search criteria.4 2 Each search resulted in a list of articles that
met the selected search criteria.43 The list cited each identified arti-
cle by its author and title, among other parameters describing the ar-
ticle.44 The customers could then, at their discretion, review the full
text of any article cited on the list.
4 5
The plaintiffs argued that their grant to the print publishers was
limited and that the defendants infringed on their copyrights by in-
cluding their articles in electronic databases and selling the right to




37. See id. This statement and the two preceding notes are true with respect
to all but one of the e-publishers' products. E-publisher UMI also published
General Periodicals OnDisc, an image-based reproduction of the New York
Times Book Review and Sunday Magazine. See id. at 806. The application of
copyright law to General Periodicals OnDisc, and similar e-publications, is
not the subject of this Note.
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do so.46 The defendants47 countered that the plaintiffs expressly
contractually granted them the right to use their articles in electronic
databases,48 that such databases were archival in nature,49 that the
right of first publication included various media,50 and that section
201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 statutorily granted them the
right to use their articles in electronic database revisions of the origi-
nal publication.
51
The Tasini court found that the plaintiffs did not expressly con-
tractually license the defendants to use the articles in electronic data-
bases 52 and that the right to first publish was limited to one form of
media, not each or all.53 However, the court also found that section
201(c) of the Copyright Act statutorily granted the transferable li-
cense to use the articles in any revision of the original periodical to
the defendants. 54 The court held that, since the e-publications quali-
fied as revisions to the original periodicals, the defendants did not in-
fringe on the plaintiffs' copyrights.55
The Southern District of New York recently denied the petition
for rehearing in a long opinion that purported to clarify its previous
ruling.56 The plaintiffs' appeal is currently under consideration by
the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
57
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
Part III of this Note describes the reasoning of the court: Sec-
tion ILI.A describes the court's analysis of the contracts between the
46. See id. at 809.
47. The Atlantic Monthly, a former defendant, settled its dispute with the
plaintiffs prior to the decision at issue. See id. at 806 n. . See also Ross Ker-
ber, Atlantic Monthly Agrees to Settle Action Over Electronic Publishing,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1996, at B6.
48. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 809.
49. Seeid. at811.
50. See id. at 811-12.
51. See id. at 809.
52. Seeid. at 812.
53. See id.
54. Seeid. at819.
55. See id. at 825-26.
56. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
57. See Tasini v. New York Times Co., No. 97-9181 (2d Cir. filed Feb. 3,
1998).
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plaintiffs and defendants; Section III.B describes the court's analysis
of the Copyright Act as it applies to the facts of the case; and Section
III.C describes the court's application of case law to the facts of the
case and recounts the court's holding.
A. Contract Interpretation
The court began by addressing the allegations of Newsday and
Sports filustrated that the plaintiffs contractually granted them the
right to use the articles in electronic databases.58 Section 204(a) of
the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "[a] transfer of copyright
ownership... is not valid unless an instrument or conveyance, or a
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the
owner of the rights conveyed." 59 In light of this rule and the fact that
it had only a verbal agreement with the plaintiffs, the New York
Times declined to claim an express transfer of the exclusive right to
use the articles in electronic databases. 60 The court minimally re-
quired that the writing be clear to be effective in transferring copy-
right ownership. 6'
Newsday argued that the legend of the checks made out to the
plaintiffs satisfied the writing requirement.62 The legend indicated
that the plaintiffs' endorsement of the check transferred the right to
include the articles in "electronic library archives." 63 Newsday ar-
gued that the legend included the right to use the article in a com-
mercial database.64 The court rejected this argument on two grounds.
First, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not sign or even receive
the checks until after Newsday had already transferred the electronic
version of the articles to MEAD for inclusion in NEXIS. 65 Since
58. See Tasinil, 972 F. Supp. at 810.
59. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994)).
60. See id. Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act may not exclude the trans-
fer of a non-exclusive license without a writing signed by the author. See
MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.11 [A] (2d ed.
1995). Accordingly, since none of the defendants claimed an exclusive right to
e-publish the article, any alleged copyright transfer would qualify as a non-
exclusive license and may not require a writing to be valid.
61. See Tasinil, 972 F. Supp. at 810.
62. See id. at 810-11.
63. Id. at 807.
64. Seeid. at 810.
65. See id.
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there was no evidence that the plaintiffs were aware of the legend's
terms prior to receiving their checks, the court ruled the check leg-
ends did not document a prior oral agreement. 66 Second, the court
noted that Newsday maintained its own electronic library archive
system, distinct from the commercial databases. 67  The court ex-
plained that the existence of the two types of electronic databases-
commercial and archival-made the legend's language ambiguous.
68
Sports Illustrated's written contract with one of the plaintiffs
clearly satisfied the requirement for a writing that records a copyright
transfer.69  Accordingly, the court concentrated on the issue of
whether the contract was properly construed to include e-publication
of the article. 70 Sports illustrated argued that the grant of the right to
first publish without any media limitation should cover inclusion of
the article in NEXIS. 71 For support, Sports Illustrated relied on
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. and its progeny, decisions
which stand for the proposition that copyright grants should be inter-
preted broadly in favor of the grantee.72 The court, however, called
reliance on the Bartsch line of authority "misplaced," since none of
those decisions dealt with "a contract.., that imposed specific tem-
poral limitations such as 'first publication rights."' 73 The court then
summarily rejected the contention that first publication rights extend
to more than one type of media.
74
66. See id. at 811. The 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) requirement for a note or memo-
randum of transfer can be satisfied by a later writing which confirms the
agreement that existed at the time of transfer. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee
Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982).
67. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 811.
68. See id.
69. See id. The court implicitly concluded without comment or explanation
that a written contract satisfies the requirement for a writing to document the
transfer of a copyright.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 811-12 (citing Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391
F.2d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968)).
73. Id. at 812.
74. See id. (citing Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985) (stating "[t]he right of first publication encompasses not only the choice
whether to publish at all, but also the choices of when, where, and in what
form first to publish a work")).
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In denying a rehearing, the court explained its ruling on the
plaintiffs contract with Sports Illustrated.75 The court emphasized
that Sports Illustrated invoked only one contract clause in its argu-
ment.76 It then characterized its original ruling as follows: "the
[c]ourt found that the particular contract provision invoked by
[Sports illustrated]-the provision extending 'first' publication
rights to the publisher--did not authorize the electronic republication
of [the plaintiffs] article. 77 The court noted that "at least two pro-
visions in the contract" could be interpreted to authorize Sports Il-
lustrated to publish the plaintiff s article on NEXIS for an additional
fee.78 The court then concluded that "by declining to press a breach
of contract claim" the plaintiff precluded the court from addressing
the issue of whether Sports Illustrated had exceeded its rights under
the contract as a whole.79
In sum, the court specifically rejected the defendants' allega-
tions that the plaintiffs had contractually transferred the electronic
rights to their articles. 80 Since the plaintiffs did not contractually li-
cense the defendants to use their articles in electronic databases, the
question became whether the Copyright Act statutorily authorized
the defendants to do so.8 1 If the defendants had no statutory author-




The court began its statutory analysis by recognizing that "the
pertinent legislative history is notoriously impenetrable."8 Thus, it
endorsed a principled approach of viewing each provision of the
Copyright Act in the context of the Act as a whole.
s4
75. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 843-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
76. See id. at 844.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 811-12 n.4).
79. Id. at 845.
80. See Tasini_, 972 F. Supp. at 810-12.
81. See TasiniI, 981 F. Supp. at 844-45.
82. See id.
83. Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 812.
84. See id.
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The court then reviewed the relevant statutory provisions. First,
the court had to classify the defendants' work to determine which
statutory provisions were relevant. Both parties agreed that the de-
fendants' print publications qualify as collective works under section
101 of the Copyright Act of 1976.85 The court explained that a col-
lective work is a type of compilation 86 and then explored the subject
matter of copyright as it concerns compilations.
Section 103(b) of the Copyright Act provides that "[t]he copy-
right in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work." 87 Despite this rule, the
court acknowledged that conflicting courts of appeals decisions have
raised the possibility of a new property right in an underlying work
springing forth and vesting in the authorized user when that user in-
cludes the underlying work in a compilation or derivative work.
88
The new property rights theory gives the author of a compilation the
right to use the underlying work in exploiting the compilation. 89
85. See id. at 809. Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a
"collective work" as "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or ency-
clopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and inde-
pendent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
86. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 813 n.5. Section 101 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 defines a "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and as-
sembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an origi-
nal work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994). This provision also says that a copyright in
a compilation or derivative work "does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material." Id. Compilations are distinguishable from derivative
works by the fact that a derivative work transforms or adapts the underlying
work whereas a compilation does not. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
88. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 814. Compare Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.) (holding that the authorized creation of a deriva-
tive work grants the proprietor of the derivative work a new property right in
the underlying work), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), with Gilliam v. ABC,
538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding an infringement claim based on an un-
authorized reuse of the underlying work).
89. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 813. For example, under the new property
rights theory, the owner of copyright in a compilation of short stories would
have the right to make a movie based on those stories. Under the theory, the
author of the compilation acquires copyrights in the underlying stories by vir-
tue of their inclusion in the compilation.
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Relying on Stewart v. Abend,90 the court rejected the new property
rights theory and affirmed the plain meaning of section 103(b). 91
Thus, the court concluded that "[u]nder [s]ection 103(b), any unau-
thorized use of preexisting protected material by the creator of a de-
rivative or a collective work infringes the copyright existing in that
preexisting material."92
Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act regulates the ownership of a
copyright as it relates to contributions in collective works.93 Specifi-
cally, section 201(c) authorizes the author of a collective work to use
preexisting protected material under specific circumstances.94 The
court characterized section 201(c) as expanding "the baseline estab-
lished in [s]ection 103(b) by extending to the creators of collective
works 'only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contri-
bution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the same series."'
95
The court then defined the critical issue of the case as determining
the precise scope of the 201(c) privilege.
96
Stressing the distinction between 'rights' and section 201(c)
'privileges,' plaintiffs contended that privileges were not transfer-
able.9 7  Under this argument, the e-publishers had infringed the
plaintiffs' rights, even if their products qualified as revisions to the
original collective works. 98 The court reasoned that the use of the
term privileges emphasized the fact that section 201(c) transferred
only a subdivision of all available copyright rights.99  The court
90. 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990).
91. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 814.
92. Id.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
94. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series.
Id.
95. Tasini_, 972 F. Supp. at 814 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(c)).
96. See id. at 814.
97. See id. at 815.
98. See id.
99. Seeid. at816.
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noted that the historical context and legislative history indicate that
one of the goals of section 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 was
to overcome unfairness resulting from the indivisibility of copyright
under prior law.100 The court then interpreted sections 201(d)(1) and
201(d)(2) together to indicate that a gift, a contract, or the law can
transfer "any subdivision" of copyright rights. 1° 1 The court con-
cluded that creators of collective works are not limited in how they
exercise the rights that they do possess.
10 2
The "[p]laintiffs advance[d three] arguments in support of their
view that the framers of [s]ection 201(c) intended to limit the crea-
tors of collective works to revisi[ons] ...in the same medium in
which those collective works initially appeared."' 1 3 First, plaintiffs
argued that the failure of section 201(c) to transfer display rights
prevented publishers from e-publishing a revision because customers
cannot access the revision without an illegal display of the underly-
ing works, such as on a computer screen."' The court found that
"display of those individual contributions is permissible" provided
that it is the "incidental" result of the publisher's authorized repro-
duction or distribution.10 5 Second, plaintiffs argued that examples of
allowable revisions in the legislative history "suggest[] a narrow
scope to the term revision."'' 6 The court found that it was unwar-
ranted to find a departure from the media neutrality that otherwise
characterizes the Copyright Act of 1976 on the basis of these exam-
ples. Third, plaintiffs argued that the plain meaning of the term "re-
vision" implied something "nearly identical to the original."' 0 7 The
court countered that by disallowing revisions to individual contribu-
tions and allowing "any revision" to the collective work, Congress
100. See id. at 815.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 816.
103. Id.
104. See id. The fundamental exclusive rights in copyrighted works include
the rights to: (1) reproduce, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute copies,
(4) perform publicly, and (5) display publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
105. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 817.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 819.
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apparently intended to give publishers "significant leeway" in modi-
fying their own contribution to the collective work. 10 8 In sum, the
court rejected most of the purported limitations on the publishers'
section 201(c) privileges.
In denying a rehearing, the court extended its statutory interpre-
tation to an issue not directly addressed in the original opinion. Spe-
cifically, the court addressed the plaintiffs' contention that, under the
language of the Copyright Act, where an express contract exists,
there can be no statutory transfer of copyright. 10 9 The plaintiffs em-
phasized the clause "[i]n the absence of an express transfer" that pre-
cedes the language providing for a statutory transfer of revision
rights to the owner of copyright in a collective work. 110 Although
the court agreed that the plaintiff's contract with Sports filustrated
constituted an express transfer,"' it rejected the plaintiffs' conten-
tion.
112
The court found that the presumption of a statutory transfer of
copyrights where an express contract exists is not inconsistent with
the language of the Copyright Act.'1 3 Section 201(c) states:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of
any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective
work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of re-
producing and distributing the contribution as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that collective
work, and any later collective work in the same series. 114
To support its interpretation of the statute, the court focused on the
legislators' use of the word "only" in section 201 (c):
Instead of using the term "only" to limit those circum-
stances in which the specified privileges apply, [s]ection
201(c) uses the term "only" to suggest that the specified
108. See id.
109. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
110. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(c)).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 845.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
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privileges represent a floor-i.e., a minimum level of pro-
tection which, if unenhanced by express agreement, pub-
lishers are generally presumed to possess."
5
Relying on Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.," 6 the court
expounded, "it is an author's burden to demonstrate that any agree-
ment between the parties limits a publisher to fewer than those [pre-
sumed] privileges."' 17 The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed
to satisfy their burden of proving that the contract with Sports Illus-
trated excluded the statutory transfer of revision rights. 18 Thus, the
court implicitly found that, unless a transfer agreement expressly ex-
cludes it, section 201(c) transfers revision rights to copyright owners
of collective works"19
The court acknowledged that "Congress could not have fully
anticipated" the effect of section 201(c) on the evolving publishing
industry since it could not predict how new technology would affect
the value of revision rights. 120 Remarking that "courts must apply
[s]ection 201(c) according to its terms," the court concluded that
Congress was "free to revise that provision to achieve a more equita-
ble result."'
121
The fundamental conclusion of the court's statutory analysis is
that section 201(c) requires that publishers' later use of individual
contributions be part of a work which qualifies as a revision of their
original collective work. 122 The court next analyzed case law to de-
termine if the e-publications qualify as revisions.
C. Application of Case Law to Define Revision
Having concluded that the defendants have the right to use the
plaintiffs' articles in any revision of their collective work, the court
began its quest to define "any revision" by adopting the principle that
115. Tasini I, 981 F. Supp. at 845.
116. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
117. Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. at 845.
118. See id. at 845-46.
119. See id.




a revision "must be recognizable as a version of a preexisting collec-
tive work."'12 3 Relying on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co.,124 the court found that selection and arrangement
of individual contributions are the only original aspects that copy-
right holders of collective works might claim as their own protect-
able contribution. 25 Thus, the court concluded that the defendants
must preserve their original selection or arrangement if they expect
their work to qualify as a revision under section 201(c). 126 "Indeed,
it is only if such a distinguishing original characteristic remains that
the resulting creation can fairly be termed a revision of 'that collec-
tive work' which preceded it.'
l2 7
Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' e-publications "deal in in-
dividual articles and not in collective works."'1 8 Following Feist's
approach, the court addressed this allegation by (1) identifying the
distinguishing original characteristics of the original collective works
and (2) determining whether those characteristics were preserved.1
29
The court inverted an accepted proposition to make existing case
law applicable to the never before considered issue. 13 Under exist-
ing case law, a plaintiff proves copyright infringement of a compila-
tion by showing that the selection or arrangement of the offending
work is 'substantially similar' to that of the copyrighted work.1
3 '
Without explaining how it reached its conclusion, the court deter-
mined that a similar analysis would lead to the opposite result when
applied to the issue of this case. 132 More specifically, the court rea-
soned that the defendant could prove that the offending work is a
permissible revision by showing that the selection or arrangement of
the offending work is substantially similar to the protectable selec-
tion or arrangement of the original compilation. 133 Applying the new
123. Id. at 820.
124. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
125. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 820.




130. See id. at 822.
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rule to this case, the defendants could prove that the e-publications
were permissible revisions that did not infringe the plaintiffs' un-
derlying articles by showing that their selection or arrangement was
substantially similar to the protectable selection or arrangement of
the original print periodicals. 34
The court next reviewed case law on infringement of compila-
tion copyrights to determine what qualifies as being substantially
similar. 35 First, the court acknowledged that under Feist some com-
pilations do not have sufficiently creative selection or arrangement to
be protectable by copyright law.136 Without a protectable aspect, a
collective work can never be infringed.137 Quoting Lipton v. Nature
Co.,138 the court further explained that infringement exists where a
subsequent work contains "essentially the same selection" as the
original work. 13 9 Quoting Kregos v. Associated Press,14 0 the court
affirmed that there is no infringement where a subsequent work "dif-
fer[s] in selection by 'more than a trivial degree' from the work that
preceded it.' 141 Finally, the court noted that CCC Information Serv-
ices, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc. 142 held that a com-
puter database infringes the copyright in an original, hard copy, peri-
odical compilation by using the same selection and underlying
works.
143
Returning to the facts in Tasini, the court found that the selec-
tion of articles for inclusion is a defining original aspect of the origi-
nal collective work. 144 "[E]ach publisher's selection of articles for
inclusion in their collective works reveals significant originality and
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 358-59 (1991)).
137. See id.
138. 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
139. Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 823 (quoting Lipton, 71 F.3d at 471).
140. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
141. Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 823 (quoting Kregos, 937 F.2d at 710).
142. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).
143. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 824 (citing CCC, 44 F.3d at 68 n.8).
144. See id.
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editorial discretion."'145 "The New York Times perhaps even repre-
sents the paradigm, the epitome of a publication in which selection
alone reflects sufficient originality to merit copyright protection."
' 146
Plaintiffs argued that, even if selection alone makes the collec-
tive work protectable, inclusion of the selection in an electronic da-
tabase, alongside countless other articles from other issues and other
periodicals, destroys it. 14 7 The court stressed, however, that under
CCC, "immersion into a larger data[]base does not automatically
mean.., that the defendant publishers' protected original selection is
lost." 48 Indeed, the court found that the defendant publishers pre-
served the original selection in two ways: (1) by adding a header to
each article's text file which identifies the page number, issue, and
publication in which the article first appeared; and (2) by separating
all articles' text files from a particular publication into a library
within the larger database. 149 Hence, the court concluded that the
print publishers' "original selection remains evident online."'
150
The court admitted that the e-publication did not preserve the ar-
rangement of the original print publication, including the photos and
page layout.151 However, the court dismissed the differences be-
tween the original collective works and the electronic databases, em-
phasizing that "a revision is identified on the basis of what it retains
of a prior work and not on the basis of what it loses."'52 Citing Key
Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,
Inc., 53 the court found that "where a compilation possesses both an
original arrangement and an original selection, a substantial similar-
ity persists even where the original arrangement is sacrificed.'
15 4
145. Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
146. Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 823.
147. See id. at 823-24.




152. Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. at 849-50 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (stating that "'no plagiarist can ex-
cuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate"')).
153. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
154. Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 825 (citing Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514).
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To summarize, the court delineated the rule that where a subse-
quent work done by an unauthorized copier would infringe an origi-
nal collective work due to substantial similarity, the same subsequent
work done by an authorized copier of the original collective work
qualifies as a revision.155 Applying this rule, the court held that
"NEXIS and [the] CD-ROMs carry recognizable versions of the
publisher defendants' newspapers and magazines."' 156 Thus, "[f]or
the purposes of [s]ection 201(c), then, defendants have succeeded at
creating 'any revision[s]' of those collective works."'
157
The court supported its holding in a number of ways. To begin,
the court compared two terms of art used in the context of compila-
tion infringement: (1) substantial similarity and (2) any revision.'
58
It reasoned that a work that has substantial similarity to an earlier
work for some copyright purposes should qualify as a revision of the
earlier work under section 201 (c). 1'59
In the opinion denying the motion for rehearing, the court then
highlighted two cases cited in the original opinion: CCC and Lip-
ton.160 First, the court repeated the rule from CCC that "where it is
apparent that an entire original selection of materials has been copied
into a subsequent work, that work shares a substantial similarity with
the work that preceded it, even if the subsequent work includes nu-
merous additional materials, as well."'161 Second, the court recited
the rule from Lipton that "where it can be established that an original
selection of materials has in fact been copied into another work, it is
appropriate for a court considering a motion for summary judgment
to determine-as a matter of law-that a substantial similarity ex-
i ,t.1162ists.' ' 6
Finally, the court emphasized that substantial similarity between
the original and the e-publication was not the only basis for finding
that the defendant publishers did not infiinge on the plaintiffs'
copyrights.
155. See id. at 822.
156. Id. at 825.
157. Id.
158. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. at 848.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 849 n.7.
161. Id. at 849 (citing CCC, 44 F.3d 61).
162. Id. (citing Lipton, 71 F.3d 464).
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The [c]ourt's holding did not follow automatically from the
fact that the electronic systems preserve a significant origi-
nal aspect of their hard copy counterparts, but was based
also upon the [c]ourt's observation that each of the elec-
tronic systems could fairly be analogized to a library in
which complete issues of hard copy periodicals are made
available to researchers interested in locating particular arti-
cles of interest. In other words, the electronic systems do
not destroy the publishers' collective works; those systems
make revisions of those works available-for traditional
purposes-in new and advanced ways.
163
IV. ANALYSIS
The bulk of the Tasini court's reasoning is persuasive. The
court faltered, however, on certain key points. Part IV of this Note
critiques the court's reasoning in four parts: Section IV.A critiques
the court's conclusions with respect to the contracts between the
plaintiffs and the defendants; Section IV.B critiques the court's
statutory construction; Section IV.C critiques the court's application
of case law; and Section IV.D goes outside the paradigm identified
by the court and suggests alternative analyses for this case which are
more straightforward and produce more reasonable results.
A. Examination of the Court's Contract Interpretation
The main problem with the court's contract interpretation is its
refusal to do more.164 Nonetheless, the court made a few rulings in
its contract interpretation that are difficult to criticize: (1) without a
prior agreement to the effect, authors do not transfer rights to addi-
tional media to publishers by endorsing their paychecks, 161 (2) elec-S ,,166an
tronic databases are not necessarily "archives, and (3) a trans-ferred right "to first publish" is limited to one form of media.167
163. Id. at 848 n.6.
164. See infra Section IV.B.
165. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 812.
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B. Examination of the Court's Statutory Construction
"[T]he Tasini case was the first to interpret [section] 201(c) of
the Copyright Act."'16 8 The court's statutory construction of that
section goes awry when it considers the plaintiffs' positions on
statutory transfers of display rights and on statutory transfers in con-
junction with express contracts.
1. Incidental display rights
Upon fixation 169 of an article, the Copyright Act vests the author
with five exclusive rights in the work: reproduction, preparation of
derivative works, distribution, performance, and display.17 Section
201(c) does not transfer display rights from the author of a contrib-
uting work to the publisher of a collective work. 17 1 In fact, section
201(c) transfers only reproduction and distribution rights. 172 There-
fore, the defendant publishers have no right to display the plaintiffs'
articles under section 201(c).
The plaintiffs argued that projection of a text file on a computer
screen is an unauthorized display and that such a display is an essen-
tial part of the defendants' e-publication.' 73 The Copyright Act de-
fines the "display" of a work as "show[ing] a copy of it, either di-
rectly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other
168. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Revising Copyrights and Wrongs: New Media as
Copying Machines, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1, 1997, at B9.
169. 'Fixation' is one of the basic requirements for copyright protection un-
der the Act.
Copyright protection subsists [only in] ... works [which are] fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
171. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
172. See id.
173. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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device or process."'174 The e-publishers in this case projected copies
of the plaintiffs' articles on computer screens for their customers.
75
Although computer screens and television monitors are so similar
that they can be used interchangeably, the court refused to accept the
plaintiffs' characterization of that showing as a display.'76 Showing
a copy by means of a computer screen should certainly qualify as
showing by means of "any other device or process."'
77
Instead, the court inexplicably found that "display of those indi-
vidual contributions is permissible" provided that it is "incidental" to
the publisher's authorized reproduction or distribution. 178 This rul-
ing is clearly at odds with section 106, which distinguishes between
the right to display and the right to reproduce or distribute. 179 Fur-
thermore, the ruling sets a bad precedent under which incidental in-
fringement of the exclusive rights in copyrighted works is permissi-
ble, even if one who would otherwise be expected to pay for the right
intentionally infringes. Finally, it is important to note that showing
copies on computer screens is a vital, not incidental, phase in the
process of e-publication.
2. Presumption of statutory transfer of revision rights
The clause, "[i]n the absence of an express transfer of the copy-
right or of any rights under it," notably precedes the clause in section
201(c) which creates the presumption of a transfer of revision rights
174. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
175. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 807-09.
176. See id. at 816-17.
177. In addition to the direct showings of a copy of a work, "display"
would include the projection of an image on a screen or other sur-
face by any method, the transmission of an image by electronic or
other means, and the showing of an image on a cathode ray tube,
or similar viewing apparatus connected with any sort of informa-
tion storage and retrieval system.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976).
178. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 817.
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 109(c) additionally authorizes "the
owner of a particular copy... to display that copy publicly, either directly or
by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the
place where the copy is located." 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994). The narrow
drafting of this right and the doctrine of expressio unis both suggest that more
remote or extensive display, even by the legal owner of a copy, is not author-
ized by the Copyright Act of 1976.
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to the owner of a copyright in a collective work. 180 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs contended that where an express transfer exists, there is no
such presumption.18 ' The plaintiffs took the position that there is no
presumption of a statutory transfer of revision rights where an ex-
press transfer exists. 182 The court took the opposite position-that
the presumption arises even where there is an express transfer of
some portion of a copyright. 183 Moreover, the court reinforced its
presumption by requiring the plaintiffs to raise a breach of contract
claim before it would consider whether an express transfer rebutted
the presumption.
184
Neither party alleged that the written contract between Sports
Illustrated and plaintiff Whitford did not include all of the terms of
their agreement. 185 The contract did not mention e-publishing or re-
vision rights by name, but did include three provisions that trans-
ferred some of the author's rights to Sports illustrated.186 The plain-
tiff took the position that the rights at issue were clearly outside the
scope of the transfer and therefore brought a copyright infringement
claim, rather than a breach of contract claim, against Sports Illus-
trated.187 Sports Illustrated raised only one of the contract provi-
sions as a defense against the infringement claim. 188 Since neither
180. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
181. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
182. See id.
183. See id. at 845-46.
184. See id. at 846 ("[W]here a writer attempts to deny a publisher certain of
the [s]ection 201(c) privileges, . . . that writer must defeat the statutory pre-
sumption by demonstrating an express transfer reflecting the desired limita-
tions."). In the court's interpretation, the limiting phrase---"[i]n the absence of
an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it"--means that the
section 201(c) presumption that revision rights are transferred applies in the
absence of an express transfer of more rights. See id. at 845-46.
185. See generally Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 809.
186. See id. at 807.
187. See Tasini I, 981 F. Supp. at 845.
188. See id. at 844. One of the other provisions conditionally granted Sports
Illustrated "the right to republish the Story or any portions thereof in or in
connection with the Magazine or in other publications published by Time Inc.
Magazine Company, its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates." Id. (italics omit-
ted). The court noted that the contract provision that was not raised as a de-
fense by Sports Illustrated "appears explicitly to authorize the republication of
[plaintiff s] article as part of a revised version of [Sports fllustrated] ... pro-
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the plaintiff nor Sports Illustrated alleged that other contract provi-
sions had transferred the rights exercised by the publishers, the court
refused to examine the contract in its entirety. The court found that,
since the plaintiff "declin[ed] to press a breach of contract claim, ...
the [c]ourt could not make any conclusive determination as to
whether [Sports illustrated] had in fact exceeded the full extent of its
rights under the contract."'
8 9
Thus, although the court recognized that an express transfer of
some portion of the copyright had transpired, the court declined to
examine the contract to determine whether Sports Illustrated's use of
the plaintiffs article exceeded the scope of its grant and therefore
constituted copyright infringement. Instead, "the [c]ourt resorted to
the [s]ection 201(c) presumption extending certain limited privileges
to publishers."'190 In contraposition to the language of section 201(c),
the court applied the presumption in the presence of an express trans-
fer. Further, the court refused to determine whether the express
transfer negated its presumption in the absence of a breach of con-
tract claim.' 9'
The court's position that revision rights are presumptively trans-
ferred to publishers of collective works by operation of section
201(c) presents two problems. First, the court goes too far in mini-
mizing the significance of the introductory clause in the sentence that
allows for the possibility of a statutory transfer. The court effec-
tively interprets the statutory language "[iln the absence of an ex-
press transfer" to mean unless expressly negated by a contract at is-
sue in a breach of contract suit.192 Since parties to a copyright
transfer can contractually void a statutory presumption without
this statutory permission, 193 the introductory clause is essentially
meaningless under the court's interpretation. Thus, the court's
vided that [plaintiff] is paid." Id. at 844-45. The plaintiff's position was that
the noted provision "in no way implicated electronic rights." Id. at 845.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 845-46.
192. See id. at 844-45.
193. A "presumption" is an inference in favor of a particular fact which can
be overcome by evidence to the contrary. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1185 (6th ed. 1990).
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construction violates the primary rule of legal interpretation-inter-
pret the whole so that each clause has an effect.
194
Second, the court's position that revision rights are presump-
tively transferred to publishers of collective works by operation of
section 201(c) contravenes public policy. The court's presumption
encourages publishers of collective works to enter into incomplete
contracts with contributing authors. Publishers who fail to address
the issue of revision rights in their contracts with authors benefit
from the section 201(c) presumption that the author has granted them
revision rights. Further, under Tasini, authors cannot rebut the pre-
sumptive transfer of revision rights without raising a breach of con-
tract claim. 195 Thus, there is a strong disincentive for publishers to
negotiate with authors on the transfer of revision rights. Contrary to
the intent of the legislature in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976,
authors will have difficulty dividing up the bundle of exclusive rights
which constitute a copyright and transferring a limited portion of the
whole.
196
The court's requirement that a copyright owner allege breach of
contract before an express transfer can rebut the statutory presump-
tion presents an additional problem. The problem is simple-a
breach of contract claim is usually distinct from a copyright in-
fringement claim. A copyright owner must determine that his con-
tractual rights, not his statutory copyright rights, were violated in or-
der to properly bring a breach of contract claim. For example, where
no contract exists between the parties, the copyright owner clearly
has no breach of contract claim against an alleged infringer. Simi-
larly, where the copyright owner has granted a licensee a subset of
his copyright rights-such as the right to distribute the work-and
the licensee has chosen to exercise a distinct subset of those rights-
such as the right to reproduce the work, the copyright owner clearly
has a claim for copyright infringement but no claim for breach of
194. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395, 404 (1950).
195. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. at 845-46.
196. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976); 17 U.S.C § 201(d)(1) (1994)
(stating that "[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred... in part").
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contract.' 97 Thus, where no contract violation has occurred, a copy-
right owner may be barred from contesting the presumption even
when the express transfer clearly would not encompass revision
rights. Courts should not require authors to raise a breach of contract
claim in order to protect their exclusive rights under the Copyright
Act.
198
C. Examination of the Court's Application of
Case Law to Define Revision
Case law establishes the prima facie elements of a copyright in-
fringement claim: (1) the existence of a valid copyright, (2) copying
of the copyrighted work, and (3) unlawful appropriation.' 99 In Ta-
sini, the defendants admitted to copying the plaintiffs' copyrighted
works and did not contest the validity of the plaintiffs' copyrights.
200
Thus, the critical issue was whether the defendants unlawfully ap-
propriated the plaintiffs' work.
There are several approaches to determining whether an unlaw-
ful appropriation has occurred. The "substantial similarity" test finds
unlawful appropriation where the allegedly infringing work is sub-
stantially similar to the allegedly infringed work.20 1 The "ordinary
observer" test finds unlawful appropriation when an ordinary ob-
server would tend to overlook the differences between the works and
consider their appeal the same.2 °2 The Tasini court explicitly re-
jected the ordinary observer test.2 D3 An "abstraction, filtration, and
comparison" test also exists.204 In practice, the abstraction, filtration,
and comparison test is basically the same as the substantial similarity
197. "[W]hen a license is limited in scope, exploitation of the copyrighted
work outside the specified limits constitutes infringement." 3 MELVILLE B.
NMMER & DAVID NMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.15[A] (rev. ed.
1998) (citing S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087-88 (9th Cir.
1989)).
198. The Copyright Act of 1976 neither includes breach of contract in its
definition of copyright infringement nor requires a breach of contract as a pre-
requisite for an infringement remedy. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (1994).
199. See LEAFFER, supra note 60, § 9.2, at 285.
200. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
201. See LEAFFER, supra note 60, § 9.6[C], at 297.
202. See id. § 9.6[B], at 296.
203. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 849 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
204. See LEAFFER, supra note 60, § 9.5[F], at 295.
April 1999] TASINI: WRONG ISSUE, WRONG PRESUMPTION 867
test.205 The court considers the defendants' original collective works
in the abstract, filters out those elements-such as the plaintiffs'
contributions-for which the defendants cannot claim copyright
protection, and compares the remainder to the alleged revision using
substantial similarity as the test for unlawful appropriation.
20 6
1. Critique of the court's premise
There is a twist in the Tasini case. Whereas courts have always
used the substantial similarity test only to prove unlawful appropria-
tion-the final element of copyright infringement-the Tasini court
used the test to prove no unlawful appropriation and, hence, no copy-
right infringement.2 °7 The court delineated the rule that, where a
subsequent work by an unauthorized copier would infringe an origi-
nal collective work due to substantial similarity, the same subsequent
work by an authorized copier of the original collective work qualifies
as a revision.20 8 The advantage of this premise is that where no
guiding case law previously existed, now suddenly, a plethora of
such exists.
The court, however, ignored the infirmity of this premise. The
court overlooked the function of the substantial similarity test, which
is to distinguish between infringement and acceptable use of copy-
righted work, to discriminate between 'lawful' and 'unlawful' ap-
propriation.20 9 No matter how courts describe the process, at its core
it is a subjective judgment of what behavior should be unlawful. In
making this judgment, a court necessarily considers the specific
context of the behavior. However, the Tasini court goes beyond
mere application of precedent defining unlawful appropriation to
new and different contexts. The Tasini court tries to apply the in-
verse of the case rulings.210 In essence, the court applied rulings
deeming uses unlawful in one context as examples to define uses that
205. See id.
206. See id.; Tasini I, 981 F. Supp. at 849 n.7.
207. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 826.
208. See id. at 822.
209. See LEAFFER, supra note 60, § 9.6[C], at 297.
210. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 822-23.
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are lawful in another context.211 That much wringing will squeeze
the wisdom out of any legal precedent.
In the words of Monty Python, "affirmatives can only be par-
tially converted: all of Alma Cogan is dead, but only some of the
class of dead people are Alma Cogan." 212 It is easy when inverting
an affirmative statement to fall into an invalid syllogism.
2. Critique of the application of the court's premise
"[I]t is only if... a distinguishing original characteristic [such
as selection] remains that the resulting creation can fairly be termed a
revision of 'that collective work' which preceded it."213 The selec-
tion of what to include is a defining and protectable characteristic of
the original print periodicals.214  Even accepting, arguendo, the
court's premise that the defendants acquired revision rights to the
plaintiffs' underlying works, each e-publication does not necessarily
qualify as a revision within the meaning of section 201(c).
First, the e-publications do not preserve the selection of the
original periodicals. Magazines and newspapers consist of more than
just the raw text of articles. Traditional periodicals, as a rule, include
pictures, advertisements, and other elements in addition to articles.
The selection of which of those other elements to include is a large
part of the selection of materials that define a periodical. The court
admitted that the e-publications do not preserve the selection of
photographs and advertisements.215 Under the theory that an original
selection alone is sufficient to define a collective work,216 the court
dismissed these materials as part of the arrangement of the periodi-
cals. 217 Nonetheless, the court proclaimed that "[i]n order to pre-
serve an original selection of materials, . . . a subsequent work must
211. See id. at 822-26.
212. MONTY PYTHON, The Logician's Discussion, on THE ALBUM OF THE
SOUNDTRACK OF THE TRAILER OF THE FILM OF MONTY PYTHON AND THE
HOLY GRAIL (Mr. and Mrs. and Mrs. Zambesi transcribers, visited Jan. 25,
1999) <http://www.mwscomp.com/movies/grail/g-logic.htm>.
213. Tasinil, 972 F. Supp. at 821.
214. See id. at 823.
215. See id. at 824.
216. See id. at 825 (citing Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g
Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)).
217. See id.
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copy more than a 'certain percentage' of those materials."2 18 The
court is splitting hairs by claiming that the e-publications preserved
the print periodicals' original selection of articles when the selection
of photographs, advertisements, and other elements is obviously not
preserved. At best, the e-publications preserve a 'certain percentage'
of the total selection that defines the original periodicals.
Second, even assuming that the e-publications preserved the
original selection of the periodicals, the selection of the e-
publications is not substantially similar to the original selection of
the periodical. Most people would agree that a selection of millions
is profoundly different from a selection of three. The court, how-
ever, stresses that under CCC, "immersion into a larger data[]base
does not automatically mean, however, that the defendant publishers'
protected original selection is lost., 219 The court then found that the
e-publishers preserved the original selection in two ways: (1) by
adding a header to each article's text file which identifies the issue,
page number, and publication in which the article first appeared and
(2) by separating all articles' text files from a particular publication
into a library within the larger database. 220 For support, the court
cites the rule from Lipton that copying an original selection into an-
other work is sufficient alone for a finding of substantial similar-
ity.
221
The court based its finding on a mischaracterization of CCC.
CCC did not hold that a "computer data[]base provider infringed
[the] plaintiffs [sic] copyright in [a] book of used car valuations by
including [the] same selection of vehicles and [the] same price esti-
mates into [sic] [a] larger online system., 222 Rather, CCC held that
the defendant, who happened to be a computer database provider, in-
fringed the plaintiff s copyright by using the plaintiff's protected car
valuations; the fact that the defendant used the plaintiffs valuations
218. Id. at 823 (citing Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 573
(9th Cir. 1987)).
219. Id. at 824 (citing CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Re-
ports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 68 n.8 (2d Cir. 1994)).
220. See id.
221. See Tasini 11, 981 F. Supp. at 849 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d
464 (2d Cir. 1995)).
222. Id. (citing CCC, 44 F.3d 61).
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in a computer database was not material to the decision.223 Thus,
immersion in a larger database may automatically destroy the origi-
nal selection.
Furthermore, the court's reliance on Lipton to support its posi-
tion is misplaced. Lipton did not hold that "where it can be estab-
lished that an original selection of materials has in fact been copied
into another work, it is appropriate for a court considering a motion
for summary judgment to determine-as a matter of law-that a sub-
,,224stantial similarity exists. Rather, Lipton specifically held that a
selection of seventy-two terms of venery225 is substantially similar to
an original selection of seventy-seven such terms where seventy-one
of the seventy-two terms were copied from the original selection of
seventy-seven. 226 Contrary to the court's characterization, Lipton
tends to support the position that a subsequent work which copies the
selection of an original work is only substantially similar when the
selections of the two compared as a whole are almost identical.
Third, Lipton implies that when trying to determine if two col-
lective works are substantially similar, it is more appropriate to com-
pare all of the protectable elements from the original collective work
to those of the subsequent work.2 7 Feist provides some guidance in
this endeavor. One interpretation of Feist is that "selection of a
whole universe is not creatively original. 228 Under this interpreta-
tion, the selection that most computer databases embody may not be
protectable by copyright law.22 9 Assuming, nonetheless, that the
223. Original aspects of Red Book's ordination and arrangement were
inextricably present whenever CCC copied and republished any
Red Book valuation, because each valuation incorporated the Red
Book editors' original judgment concerning the predicted value of
that automobile, as well as their judgment as to geographic con-
sistency within a region.
CCC, 44 F.3d at 68 n.8.
224. TasiniII, 981 F. Supp. at 849 (citing Lipton, 71 F.3d 464).
225. A "term of venery" is an archaic hunting term. THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2111 (2d ed. unabr. 1987). An ex-
ample of a term of venery is a "pride of lions." See Lipton, 71 F.3d at 467 n.2.
226. See Lipton, 71 F.3d at 471.
227. See id.
228. Bruce G. Joseph, Copyright Protection of Software and Compilations:
A Review of Significant Developments 1991-1998, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON
COPYRIGHT LAW 175, 300 (Richard Dannay chair, 1998).
229. See id.
April 1999] TASINI: WRONG ISSUE, WRONG PRESUMPTION 871
selection is protectable, we would consider what quality makes the
selection valuable. The value of the original print periodicals is at
least partially derived from their selectivity.230 In contrast, "[t]he
value of most computer data[]bases is their completeness-the se-
lection and inclusion of the 'whole' universe, not subsets of it."
2 31
While consumers value the selection of materials in the original print
periodicals partially for what is excluded, they value the selection of
material in the electronic databases primarily for what is included.
Furthermore, "[e]lectronic databases generally arrange data to en-
hance [their] electronic search and retrieval functions, rather than to
improve communication with humans.' 23 - As Feist declares in dis-
cussing the arrangement of a typical compilation, such as the original
periodicals, "[t]he compilation author typically chooses.., how to
arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by
readers."233 Thus, the arrangement of the original periodicals, which
readers valued at some level for how well they can directly process
the materials presented in their entirety, is fundamentally different
from the arrangement of the electronic databases, which users value
mostly for the speed at which they allow a computer to locate files
that meet the user's selection criteria. In sum, a comparison all of
the original distinctive elements of the print periodicals with all of
the original distinctive elements of the e-publications should fail to
qualify the e-publications as revisions of the print periodicals.
234
230. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 823.
231. Joseph, supra note 228, at 300.
232. Id. at 301. "Frequently, multi-periodical databases such as Nexis are
searched for specific topics within a large collection of works, not because of a
desire to take advantage of an editor's particular selection of articles." David
J. Loundy, Electronic Database Providers Collect Court Decisions, CI.
DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 9, 1997, at 6.
233. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348
(1991) (emphasis added).
234. Because of the removal of context--coupled with the frequent
compilation of multiple periodicals into one database for search
purposes, as well as the different audience for the original and the
electronic products-it seems disingenuous to say that a Nexis da-
tabase is merely a revision of The New York Times.
Loundy, supra note 232.
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Finally, the Second Circuit's subsequent, twin decisions in
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co.235 may reinforce this
conclusion. In the first case, the West Publishing Company argued
that four specific changes it makes to judicial opinions before incor-
porating them into its published compilations are protectable by
copyright. Those changes are as follows:
(i) rearrangement of information specifying the parties,
court, and date of decision; (ii) addition of certain informa-
tion concerning counsel; (iii) annotation to reflect subse-
quent procedural developments such as amendments and
denials of rehearing; and (iv) editing of parallel and alter-
nate citations to cases cited in the opinions in order to re-
dact ephemeral and obscure citations and to add standard
permanent citations (including West reporters).236
Since facts are not protectable, 237 West clearly had no protect-
able interest in the underlying facts, and could only claim an interest
in the selection or arrangement of those facts. 238 The appellate court
affirmed the district court's finding that West's selection and ar-
rangement are not protectable under the Copyright Act.239 It rea-
soned that, "[iun light of accepted legal conventions and other exter-
nal constraining factors, West's choices on selection and
arrangement can reasonably be viewed as obvious, typical, and
lacking even minimal creativity. '24°
Applying similar reasoning to the Tasini facts, the issue, page
number, and publication in which an article was originally published
can similarly be viewed as unprotectable facts. Adding this infor-
mation to the raw text of the plaintiffs' articles can be viewed as ob-
vious, typical, and lacking even minimal creativity in light of the
constraining factors involved, such as the NEXIS database organiza-
tion.
235. 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (West I); 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)
(West II).
236. WestI, 158 F.3d at 677.
237. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
238. See WestI, 158 F.3d at 677.
239. See id.
240. Id.
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In the second, and perhaps more pertinent case, West argued
that its competitors' use of star pagination in their CD-ROMs to in-
dicate the issue and page location of the text of judicial opinions in
West's published compilations infringed West's arrangement.24'
West relied on the fact that a "user who manipulates the data on the
CD-ROM discs could at will re-sequence the cases... into the West
arrangement." 242 The court was unconvinced, however, concluding
that "a copyrighted arrangement is not infringed... if a machine can
perceive the arrangement only after another person uses the machine
to re-arrange the material into the copyrightholder's arrangement."
243
Applying similar reasoning to the Tasini facts, the publisher's
selection-which the court found to be critical-may not be retained
if it can be perceived only after another person uses a machine to re-
create it from among a much more extensive selection and compila-
tion of materials.
D. Thinking Outside the Box
1. Rejecting the copyright paradigm
The Tasini court may have inappropriately defined the issue at
stake in the case. The issue according to the court was whether the
defendants' use of the underlying article qualifies as a revision of the
original collective work.2 " The issue according to the plaintiffs was
quite different. The plaintiffs' primary concern was whether a free-
lance author, by selling an article for publication in a periodical,
loses the right to receive compensation for additional access to the
article.
245
Leading copyright scholars have concluded that the Copyright
Act of 1976 is ill-suited to resolving issues which arise in connection
241. See WestII, 158 F.3d at 700.
242. Id. at 702.
243. Id. The court declined to follow the Eighth Circuit's opinion that found
that star pagination did infringe West's arrangement. See id. at 707 (citing
West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986)).
The court explained that the Eighth Circuit had relied on the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine, which has since been rejected by Feist. See id. at 708.
244. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
245. See Loundy, supra note 232.
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with digital networks such as the Intemet.2 46 They note that "the
most important property rights [in digital technology] are the rights
to control access to and use of information resources," 247 and further
state that "[tihe terminology of copyright as applied in this field of
commerce merely distracts from the basic issues." 248 In other words,
"[n]o need or reason exists to rely on traditional copyright concepts
of expression, originality, copying, or public performance and dis-
play."'2 49 On the contrary, the application of traditional copyright law
principles tends to distort the key issues of cases involving digital
networks.250 To guide the formulation of rights in information net-
works, the scholars quoted herein advocate the principle that "privi-
leges to access and use [of copyrighted information] should depend
on the type of use and the degree of harm to the information resource
owner.2251 This principle is crucial because "[a]uthors... often earn
much of their income from additional sales of their printed pieces
subsequent to the work's initial publication., 252 Publishers' on-line
distribution decreases the commercial benefit that authors can derive
from their work because on-line distribution increases the distribu-
tion and accessibility of their work. E-publication may consequently
harm the author not just by depriving the author of compensation for
the publisher's additional use, but also by preventing sales to other
publishers by satisfying the market demand for the article.
2. Access to digital text as new property right
Professor Ejan Mackaay states that "[f]aw specifies the bounda-
ries between neighbouring property rights only to the extent that
conflicts have actually arisen between neighbours." 253  Professor
246. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Copyright on
the Information Superhighway: Requiem for a Middleweight, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 25, 25-26 (1994).
247. Id. at 26.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 37.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 38-39.
252. David J. Loundy, Authors Waging Fight in Brave New World, CH.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 7, 1996, at 6.
253. Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the
Internet, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 13, 19
(P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed. 1996).
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Mack-aay notes that copyright law traditionally breaks works down
into categories that correspond to the controls used to protect the as-
sets. 254 Mackaay likens such protection to a fence. He states that
"the Internet amplifies the corrosion of the older fences and creates
the appearance of an open field in which al take whatever they can
click their mouse on.,
255
Tasini is the first case that has called upon the court to interpret
the term revision as it is used in United States copyright law.
25 6
Thus, following Professor Mackaay's reasoning, it is an inappropri-
ate time for new legislation on this issue.25 7 The only way to dis-
cover the proper boundaries of new property rights is through trial
and error.25 8 Professor Mackaay instead suggests that new controls
be developed through the following two-step process. First, parties
who are interested in protecting potential assets for which there is no
established or effective control create their own method of control
"using whatever devices and techniques are available to them and
making contractual arrangements.,, 259 Professor Mackaay theorizes
that experimentation of this type is actually occurring on the Inter-
net. 60 Second, after interested parties make the first moves, the law
intervenes and recognizes the method of control.261 Recognition
should occur only after a control creating a new property right has
been developed and proven practical through experience. 262 Such re-
straint is a necessary part of the realism of law.
263
This approach to developing new property rights may not be
successful when parties interested in protecting their potential new
property right-access to digital text in this case-do not have the
power to create a new control. The Publication Rights Clearing-
house, an agency created to collectively bargain on behalf of free-
254. See id. at 18.
255. Id.
256. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, supra note 168.
257. See Mackaay, supra note 253, at 18-19, 21.
258. See id. at 20-21.
259. Id. at 20.





lance authors,2 64 may represent the kind of experimental control that
Mackaay had in mind. Indeed, the agency may effectively create the
desired new property right if it gains the power needed to success-
fully negotiate with the publishers.
265
Arguably, contracts are a form of control available to all because
contracts allow parties to establish their own rules to control a par-
ticular transaction. On the other hand, society also recognizes that
unequal bargaining power can create unconscionable contracts.266 in
Tasini, individual freelance authors were dealing with powerful pub-
lisbing corporations.267 The New York Times did not negotiate with
contributing authors regarding the rights to their articles. 268 Newsday
attempted to create adhesion contracts with the plaintiffs by includ-
ing an endorsement to that effect on their payment checks. 269 Given
the publishers' methods, freelance authors may lack the power and
the tools necessary to create their own controls, despite being
264. See National Writers Union, supra note 19. The National Writers Un-
ion created Publication Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) to collect online royalties
for freelance writers. See National Writers Union, Welcome to Publication
Rights Clearinghouse (last modified Jan. 11, 1997) <http://www.nwu.org/
prc/prchome.htm>. More specifically, PRC licenses secondary rights for
members' previously published articles to UnCover, a fax reprint service. See
id.
265. Currently, the National Writers Union describes PRC as a pilot project.
See National Writers Union, Frequently Asked Questions About PRC (last
modified Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.nwu.org/prc/prchome.htm>. The Na-
tional Writers Union expresses hope that PRC's deal with UnCover and other
efforts will enable it to negotiate similar deals with other companies and turn
the PRC model into the industry standard. See id.
266. "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence
of meaningful choice.. .. " Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
267. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 804.
268. See id. at 807.
269. An "adhesion contract" is "a take-it-or-leave-it proposition ... under
which the only alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection." E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, I FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2d. ed. 1998).
The Newsday check legends read:
Signature required. Check void if this endorsement is altered. This
check accepted as full payment for first-time publication rights.., to
material described on face of check in all editions published by News-
day and for the right to include such material in electronic library ar-
chives.
Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 807.
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interested parties. Nonetheless, courts should respect authors' at-
tempts to develop controls.
The court claimed that its position that publishers are presumed
to have acquired revision rights by operation of section 201(c) is not
inconsistent with the language of the Copyright Act.270 However, its
position is inconsistent with the principle of freedom of contract
between the parties, particularly where the court refused to allow the
existence of an express contract to rebut the presumption without a
breach of contract claim. The court should apply the presumption
only where required by the Copyright Act: "in the absence of an ex-
press transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it."'271 This
situation arises when parties fail to discuss or describe which rights,
conferred on the author by copyright law, are transferred under their
agreement. 2 72 Conversely, when an agreement between the parties
expressly specifies which copyright rights are transferred, the court
should apply the standard rules of contract interpretation and not ap-
ply the presumption. Alternatively, the court could still apply the
presumption in such a case but allow the express transfer to rebut the
presumption. Either approach-no presumption where there is an
express transfer or a presumption that is truly rebuttable-gives an
agreement between the parties its proper authority. Recognizing that
an agreement between parties can override a statutory presumption
allows interested parties to develop their own controls. Using stan-
dard contract interpretation techniques allows the parties to test the
effectiveness of their controls.
270. See Tasini II, 981 F. Supp. 841, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
271. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994) (emphasis added). Section 201(c) does not
address the situation in which there is an express transfer of the copyright or of
any rights under it. See id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "express" as fol-
lows: "Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated.
Made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, either an oral or a written transfer
agreement would qualify as an express transfer. In short, where the agreement
between the parties specifies in words the copyright or portion thereof that is
transferred, the section 201(c) presumption should not apply.
272. The parties may, for example, only discuss the price, target length of
the work, and delivery date.
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E. Interpretation of the Decision
The full ramifications of Tasini remain uncertain. On the one
hand, Tasini can be read narrowly to extend the recognized allow-
ance for publishers to put their periodicals on microfilm to CD-ROM
and NEXIS technology only. Tasini addresses only the use of CD-
ROM and NEXIS technology; the Internet is never mentioned in the
decision.
27 3
On the other hand, Tasini can be read broadly to sanction virtu-
ally any new method of distribution for collective works provided
that some aspect of the original collective work's selection, coordi-
nation, or arrangement is preserved. The court's reasoning seems to
apply to common Internet uses. The Tasini court's high valuation of
the e-publishers' attribution of the article may represent a minor
limitation. Tasini may be construed to allow dissemination of col-
lective works via the Internet, provided that a note describing the
context of its original publication accompanies each individual con-
tribution.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's analysis of the Tasini case under the Copyright Act
of 1976 was flawed. The court interpreted revision privileges avail-
able to owners of a collective work under section 201(c) too broadly.
Under the court's broad analysis, it is hard to imagine what type of
use of the underlying works would not in some way qualify as a revi-
sion.
More importantly, the court misperceived the true issue of the
case. The court failed to understand and address the plaintiffs' true
concerns. The plaintiff authors brought the case to ensure that they
would receive their fair share of revenues from the use of their work
as a commodity in the information industry.274 Recognizing that the
presumptive conference of broad revision rights on publishers of
collective works may not be equitable, 2 75 the court nonetheless
twisted case law to define previously uninterpreted statutory lan-
guage.
273. See generally Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 806, 826-27.
274. See National Writers Union, supra note 19.
275. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 826-27.
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Intellectual property scholars note that copyright law is not well
suited to the challenges of protecting intellectual property in a digital
age.276 Courts should be cautious in approaching new copyright is-
sues and consider the implications of their interpretation of statutory
language and case law before reaching a conclusion. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals should consider the realities of the new
digital age when it defines the statutory term revision.
This Note recommends that courts strive to imbue each phrase
in section 201(c) of the Copyright Act with meaning. Section 201(c)
states:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of
any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective
work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of re-
producing and distributing the contribution as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that collective
work, and any later collective work in the same series.
277
Accordingly, if the parties have made an express transfer of the
copyright or of any rights under it, then the section 201(c) presump-
tion should not apply.278 The presumption, which amounts to a
statutory transfer of some of the rights included in a copyright,
should only apply in the absence of an express transfer. Where an
express transfer exists, courts should use standard contract interpre-
tation techniques to determine what rights were transferred. This ap-
proach encourages parties to negotiate and clarify which copyright
rights are transferred by contract.
In the alternative situation, where no express transfer exists,
courts should focus on the basic question. The basic question is not:
Is the alleged revision substantially similar to the original collective
work? Rather, the basic question is: Considering the original contri-
butions of the author of the collective work, is the underlying work
being used in a revision of that collective work or in an entirely dif-
ferent collective work? Application of this standard to the Tasini
case suggests that the publishers may have the right to use the
276. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 246, at 25.
277. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
278. However, under contract law, the industry practice may indicate that the
presumption is an appropriate starting point in determining the intent of the
parties.
880 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol.32:841
plaintiffs' articles in CD-ROM collections of a magazine, such as
New York Times OnDisc, but do not have the right to include the
plaintiffs' articles in the LEXIS/NEXIS database.
Kia L. Freeman*
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